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DEUS EST. A SCOTISTIC DISCUSSION OF DEUS EST
AS A SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION1
1. Introduction
Medieval philosophers and theologians toke much interest in the
proposition Deus est. They investigated its nature: was it what is tradi-
tionally called an immediate proposition, i.e. one that could not be pro-
ved but is evident on the basis of the terms used. An example is the
principle of contradiction. Or was it a mediate proposition, known on
the basis of the knowledge of a middle term, i.e. only known by proof.
An example of such mediate proposition was 'God is eternal', which
is only true on the basis of God's immutability.
The proposition Deus est could be taken in both ways, though not
without qualification. Taken as mediate proposition it was considered
as a conclusion of a proof of God's existence. An example: the title of
Thomas Aquinas' question 2, article 1, of the first part of his Summa
theologiae is De Deo, an sit. He concludes that Deus est is self-evident
secundum se, because the predicate is the same as the subject, for God
is Being. Man in the present state, however, does not have distinct
knowledge of God's essence, so the proposition is not self-evident to
him, but needs proof. The basis of the proof is what is known to us, so
it is a proof from the effects (i.e. creatures), not from the cause (i.e.
God himself). In the well-known article 3 of the same question Thomas
presents five proofs for God's existence. In this case Deus est is the
conclusion of a proof, and therefore it is mediately known.2
Deus est can also be taken as a pmpositio per se nota. Different
kinds of such propositions were traditionally distinguished (cf., e.g.,
Gredt 1929). The habitus, or disposition by which these kinds of pro-
positions were known could belong to speculative principles, i.e. prin-
ciples which were the basis of science, and the disposition of practical
principles (this disposition is sometimes called synderesis, "conscien-
ce"). An example of the latter is that good is to be done, and evil to be
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avoided. Examples of speculative principles are: 1. The principle of
contradiction ('nothing can at the same time with the same respect be
and not be, or be such or not-such'); 2. The principle of the excluded
third ('there is no middle between being and not-being'); 3. The princi-
ple of correspondence or difference ( 'things that are identical to a third,
are mutually the same; things of which one is different from a third
from which the other is not different, are mutually different'). 4. The
principles dictum de omni and dictum de nullo ('if something is for all
cases affirmed of something else, must be affirmed of everything con-
tained under it, and if something is for all cases denied of something
else, must be denied of everything contained under it'). 5. The princi-
ple of sufficient reason ('nothing is without sufficient reason'). These
principles are formal and can be applied to everything in reality.
Another principle seems to apply only partially to reality, e.g. 'the
whole is greater than any of its constituent parts'. To establish the truth
of these self-evident propositions, there is no need to appeal to external
data, such as those of experience, except for a process of abstraction by
which a term (subject or predicate) as such is known.
Can the proposition Deus est be considered as self-evident for man in
the present state? It could be argued that it cannot, because man has no
distinct knowledge of the terms used. So only to God, or perhaps the
angels and the souls after death, the proposition is self-evident. But then a
question arises: does self-evidence necessarily imply distinct knowledge?
As I have pointed to above, Thomas and philosophers in his trail
sketch the positions of those who think Deus est to be self-evident to
man, and they accuse them of 'ontologism' (see, e.g. Buonpensiere
1903, pp. 97-99). Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) was one of the most
known advocates of this position, that was unacceptable for orthodox
chistianity. Thomists also put in this category Henry of Ghent, and some
heretics condemned by the church (cf. Denzinger 1955, nn. 1659-65).
John Duns Scotus' view also arouses interest. The subtle doctor
discusses the problem in his commentary on the Sentences I, d. 2, pars
1, q. 2 (vol. II, pp. 126-48), and criticizes Thomas' opinion. As will be
pointed out below, he denies the necessary connection between self-
evidence and distinct knowledge.
Self-evident propositions still are objects of investigation. Sometimes
they are discussed in connection with a priori propositions. I have refrai-
ned from using this term as explanation of a pmpositio per se nota, to
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avoid confusion. For not all a priori-propositions should be taken, I feel,
as self-evident. Many algebraic and arithmetical a priori-propositions (let
us assume that there are such) are not self-evident, but need complicated
proof. Perhaps one could even go a step further. One could distinguish
between self-evident propositions which are true purely on the basis of
the terms ('analytical propositions'), and self-evident propositions whose
truth is also dependent on contingent states of affairs. What kinds of pro-
positions are meant varies from philosopher to philosopher.
Duns Scotus had many followers. Now, when they did not find
Duns' theory on some subject satisfactory, they sometimes wrote sepa-
rate treatises. E.g., Francis of Mayronnes (died after 1328), probably a
direct pupil of Scotus', wrote a tract entitled Transcendentla to syste-
matize and elaborate Scotus' position. In the present paper I wish to
discuss an anonymous Tmctatus de propositione per se nota. The tract
is handed down to us in ms. Pisa. Biblioieca del Seminaria Arcivescovile
Santa Catheriana 159, ff. 121r-128r.31 have published this text elsewhe-
re, and for a discussion of the manuscript and literature about it, I refer
to that article (Bos 1995). Here 1 have the opportunity to discuss the con-
tents of the tract in detail and to place it in historical perspective. Though
the author discusses the problem of propositio per se nota on occasion
of Duns Scotus' commentary on the Sentences I, d. 2, pars I, q. 2, die
tract seems to be an independent compendium. This seems clear from
the opening (11. 5-10) and concluding (II. 954-57) lines. The author of
our tract explicitly calls Duns Scotus 'his master' (1. 9).
The author professes to be, and indeed is, a follower of Duns Scotus.
To be a Scotist does not mean to be a slavish follower. The adoption of
the formal distinction and an intensionalist semantics are the main cha-
racteristics, I feel. In other respects pupils found their own ways.
The main point brought forward by our anonymous author is that
his master is very obscure (obscurissime, \. 521) on a specific point,
viz. the problem whether a mathematician, who does not know the
nature of a line as precisely as a metaphysician (for the latter has insi-
ght into the nature of things), yet has propositiones per se note as parts
of his science.4 Further, he informs us of a variety of mid-fourteenth-
century discussions about self-evident propositions, which may lead to
further investigations, I hope. Because all the philosophers to whom it
refers wrote their commentaries on the Sentences in the first half of the
fourteenth century, our tract must have been composed after 1350. I
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cannot establish an exact date or a terminus ante quern?
In the present contribution I shall discuss the anonymous Tractates
de propositions per se nota. My analysis leads to a corroboration, on
most points, of Peter Vier's explanation of Duns Scotus' view on the
subject (Vier 1951 ). A new element is that I hope to place Duns Scotus'
interpretation more adequately in the development of the three ver-
sions of his commentaries on the Sentences, vi';. the Lectura, the
Reportatio and the Ordinauo.b The author defends the thesis that the
definition of a self-evident proposition applies to things whether they
are described with categorial terms (e.g. material things) or transcen-
dental terms (e.g. God). An examination of the tract enables us, moreo-
ver, to gain a better insight in early fourteenth-century discussions of
the a priori proposition.
2. Aristotle
First, a few words on Aristotle's view of KaB'avTO characteristic of
propositions (KOO'CIUTO is the Greek equivalent of per se).
In the background of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics is Plato's
theory of recollection. There is seldom an explicit reference to Plato in
the Posterior Analytics, but in chapter I, 1 he mentions the dilemma of
Plato's Meno.
Aristotle rejects Plato's theory of ideas because it implies an unne-
cessary duplication of reality and criticizes Plato's theory of innate
knowledge. According to Plato real knowledge is knowledge of ideas,
to which the mind has access in virtue of its pre-existence. These ideas
are irreducible realities.7 Man principally proceeds from what logical-
ly and naturally is better known, i.e. from what is known in itself or per
se. The mind possesses firm knowledge of the ideas, and it acquires
knowledge from a kind of induction.
Aristotle examines certain and unqualified knowledge whose
object cannot be other than it is. So the object of scientific knowledge
is necessary, he says (it is difficult, by the way, to decide whether the
term 'necessary' refers to the object, or to the knowledge). A necessary
connection between two properties belonging to a specific state of
affairs (npccftux) seems to be at stake. This state of affairs is approa-
ched by a man of science, e.g. that all equilateral triangles have three
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angles of which the sum equals the sum of two right angles.
Scientific proof is presented in syllogistic form and is an explana-
tion of a state of affairs proceeding by way of a middle term from neces-
sary things, as Aristotle says. The middle term refers to the cause of the
state of affairs.8 Now the question arises: from which kind of first things
does scientific knowledge proceed? Which kind of first principles form
our original knowledge? Aristotle enumerates three characteristics of
these principles: a) KOCTO rcavtóc; b) KaO'aUTO; c) KaööXou.
a) Kara itavTÓc is what Aristotle calls that of which it is not the
case that it is present in some things, and absent in others, or is some-
times in something, and sometimes not; this characteristic ensures that
an attribute universally belongs to a subject;
b) Ka6'cxi)TO: this characteristic is relevant to our discussion of a
propositio per se nota; it requires that a property belongs to a subject in
virtue of the nature of the subject, e.g. that a line is in a triangle - which
is a definition - and that each number is either even or odd - which is a
proprium, a property flowing from the essence of number; other inter-
pretations of per se are an individual concrete thing, and what could be
labelled an event; e.g. dying belongs per se to being killed;
c) KCcSoXou is the characteristic that requires that the first premiss
of the syllogism is about the whole object, viz. that a property belongs
to the subject in virtue of the whole nature of the subject. This third cha-
racteristic is a strong requirement of the scientific character of first prin-
ciples; it is about what in medieval philosophy is traditionally called the
'first subject' (or: 'first formal object') of a science. To attribute a pro-
perty to e.g. equilateral triangles cannot result in first principles. A pro-
perty should be said to apply to triangles without qualification.
Therefore, premisses having these characteristics provide an
answer to questions about the cause of a state of affairs. The question
'why' is one of the four well-known questions enumerated by Aristotle
in the beginning of his Posterior Analytics (II, 1 73b6-16). All que-
stions (viz. quia, si est, an est and quid est) are about the middle term
of the syllogism, and therefore all questions about a certain state of
affairs are reduced to first principles.
Aristotle does not speak about a self-evident proposition in the
form of'S is P', but about a thing which is in the quiddity of something
etc. This state of affairs may, of course, be expressed in the form of a
proposition. A man of science studies a property of a thing, e.g. being
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a line in the case of a triangle. Some medieval philosophers interpret
what is known per se to be a thing, others to be a proposition. Anyway,
if something known per se is taken as a thing, talking about per se pro-
perties of individual subjects, e.g. God, is easier.
In Aristotle's view, cognitive powers - be they intellectual or sen-
sitive - are no part of the definition of the per se requirement. Neither
does he consider the possibility of per se propositions of different
levels, of which some are more per se than others, contrary to the prac-
tice, after Aristotle, of some medieval philosophers, as 1 shall point out
below (cf. de Rijk 1990, pp. 232-40).
3. The Middle Ages
As I have said above, medieval philosophers firmly believe in God's
existence. God is absolutely in virtue of Himself, or per se. The que-
stion is whether man in the present state is able to know as per se the
proposition 'God exists'. Traditionally, as I have said, this is denied.
God's existence is a matter of belief or, for many philosophers (espe-
cially before the fourteenth century), a matter of proof: it is not known
in virtue of itself, or per se nota.
4, The anonymous Tractatus de propositione per se nota
The author starts by saying that he will discuss the propositio per se
nota briefly and will give an account of the work of his master, John
Duns Scotus. He adduces from another tract, not mentioned by name
and not identified by me, a distinction among five kinds of propositions
(11. 13-31). From the list, one can get a better view of the nature of a pro-
positio per se nota and its relations to other kinds. The tract starts with
the most general kind of proposition (the propositio in se), and it ends
with one of the most specific, the propositio per se nota. l ) The propo-
sitio in se has the form and nature of a proposition, but its truth is not
guaranteed, e.g. homo est lapis. 2) The propositio de se possesses truth
in addition to the attributes of the propositio in se, e.g. homo est albus.
3) The propositio secundum se possesses necessity in addition to the
above-mentioned characteristics. To this kind belong not only all modi
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dicendi per se, but also necessary propositions.9 4) The pmpositio per
se is found in any of the four kinds of the modi dicendi per se, especial-
ly in the first (the definition, e.g. 'man is an animal') and the second (the
specification of a property, e.g. 'man is capable of laughing'). 5) The
pmpositio per se nota. Our tract is about this kind, and the author defi-
nes it in the way Scotus does. The exact definition will follow below. 6)
Our author adds a sixth kind of proposition: the pmpositio immediata.10
This kind has the characteristics of a pmpositio per se nota, but moreo-
ver the subject includes die predicate essentially, which is not the case
in ail propositiones per se note. Two subspecies of pmpositio immedia-
ta are 6.1 ) the pmpositio immediata immediatione cause, and 6.2) the
pmpositio immediata immediatione demonstrationis. The latter two pro-
positions (which are conclusions) are also called per se note, but not in
a sense that can be accepted by Duns Scotus and his anonymous fol-
lower, for reasons to be explained below.
Next (11. 42-76), the author distinguishes between the truth, neces-
sity and evidence of propositions. These distinctions are ordered accor-
ding to increasing extent. Truth applies to the correspondence between
the terms used and the extra-mental reality, or to the union of subject
and predicate terms. Necessity refers to the union between subject and
predicate terms which cannot be dissolved, even by divine power.
There is a distinction between nécessitas simpliciter and nécessitas
secundum quid. The first kind is relevant for our author's text.
Evidence is analyzed in evidentia formalis and evidentia originalis. In
their definition of a pmpositio per se nota John Duns Scotus and his
pupil Francis of Mayronnes have evidentia originalis in mind. Every
true proposition possesses formal evidence, though not intrinsically,
i.e. in virtue of the terms used. It may already be clear from the prece-
ding that, according to our Scotistic author, a pmpositio per se nota
does not find its evidence in anything outside it.
Duns Scotus, our author says, gives a strict definition of a pmposi-
tio per se nota, not a general one as Francis of Mayronnes and others
do (11.99-119). Though in many respects a Scotist, Francis also accepts
some empirical propositions, such as nix est alba, as per se note.
According to Duns Scotus, our author says, propositions such as sol est
lucidus are not per se note, because God's omnipotence can separate
the accident, viz. light, from the substance, viz. the sun. Our author
interprets Duns as saying that the senses are unable to see the perfec-
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tion of propositions. According to him, Aristotle already noted that a
proposition such nix est alba was correct and true, but not per se nota.
So the question: are the only truths that are evident in virtue of
themselves of the kind of 'a whole (in the sense of 'what contains as
much as any of its parts and more than that') is greater than any of its
constituent parts', i.e. truths known apart from knowledge of existen-
ce, and only in virtue of their terms? Or to put it in fourteenth-century
terminology: are only those truths per se note which are known by
abstractive knowledge (i.e. knowledge that abstracts from existence)?
Or do also propositions such as natura est, and nix est alba, which are
known by intuitive knowledge, i.e. knowledge that includes existence,
of which the terms have a content derived from experience belong to
the class of propositiones per se note!
A propositio per se nota can be interpreted in three ways, our
author says (11. 198-92). 1) Asperse evidentialis. This is Scotus' view:
a propositio per se nota is known for him/her who has knowledge of
the terms, be this knowledge distinct or opaque (confusa). 2) As pro-
positio per se nota experimentalis: a propositio per se nota temporali-
ter, e.g. nix est alba, or lac est dulce, etc. 3) As propositio de se assen-
tibilis. This is the sense in which the principle 'a whole is greater than
any of its constituent parts' is known. The third interpretation can be
accepted by Duns Scotus, if it is not taken in the sense that the intel-
lect plays an essential role in the knowledge of a propositio per se nota.
This would result in Thomas Aquinas' interpretation. ' '
Thus a mathematician knows self-evident propositions, even thou-
gh he has only opaque knowledge of the terms (in contrast to the
metaphysician who knows the same terms distinctly). In this way a
mathematician knows the proposition 'a line is length without width'
whereas a metaphysician knows the terms distinctly, i.e. knows the
nature of a line. As we shall see below, this possibility is accepted by
Scotus: in this way mathematics and other sciences have their own pro-
positiones per se note.
Next, our author gives Scotus' definition of a. propositio per se nota, and
explains it in detail: "propositio per se nota est ilia que ex terminis propriis,
ut sui sunt, habet evidentem veritatem sue complexionis" (II. 207-209).
Per se notion means three things, he says: 1) non cum alio notum:
this is the third way in which Aristotle interprets per se, i.e. as an indi-
vidual thing, and so each absolute thing, be it a substance, quantity12
DEUS EST AS A SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION 4] 7
or quality is per se notum; 2) non per aliud notum: in this way acci-
dents are perse nota, whereas substances are not, because the latter are
known only through their accidents; 3) non notum per aliud ut per cau-
sant', in this way many first principles and other propositions which are
self-evident are known per se in virtue of the terms. Conclusions can-
not be known in this way.
According to our author,13 Scotus" strict definition is in agreement
with Augustine. Many theologians (our anonymous included) refer to
Augustine's De vera religions (e.g. XXX, 56), where it is said that the
evidence of propositions is knowledge of the eternal rules, i.e. the ideas
in God's mind. A propositio per se nota does not have a causa com-
particeps, i.e. an external cause: it is known in virtue of the terms. He
explains Scotus' qualification "ut sui sunt" by saying that some terms,
such as diffinitum, diffinitio and passio are materially the same, but one
is logically prior to another. So in a syllogism, the premise omne ani-
mal rationale est risibile is logically prior to omnis homo est risibilis
(11. 282-95).
This brings our author to a discussion (which goes well beyond
Scotus' text) of two types of definition: one has a more realistic, almo-
st Platonic flavour, and is called 'broader' (viz. a definition by quid-
dity), while the other, the strict kind, explicitly described as
Aristotelian, and called "in use by the masters of arts", is a definition
by genus and differentia (11. 371-87). This part of the tract leads the
author to the refined conclusion that for a proposition to be per se nota
it is required that its self-evidence should result from the knowledge of
the terms, be these terms known distincly or confusedly, be they cate-
gorial or transcendental, be they within a genus or outside, and whether
diffinitiones or diffinita are involved. For if diffinitio and diffinitum were
the same, 1 ) there would result a petitio principii in a syllogism, 2)
cause and effect would be the same, 3) a syllogistic proof would have
two terms instead of three, and 4) the same concept would be both logi-
cally prior and logically posterior (11. 470-91). The existence of the
fourth absurdity is his own thesis, the audior says. This passage is
important, because according to this distinction the proposition Deus
est is not per se nota, for God does not fall under a genus and is, the-
refore, not an Aristotelian definable in categorial terms.
Then, the author continues, Duns Scotus presents three theses,
which summarize the preceding discussion: 1) a. propositio per se nota
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cannot have an external cause; 2) the terms must be distinct; 3) a pro-
position about an essence that is opaquely known is self-evident when
the proposition is only known if the same essence is known distinctly.'4
A discussion follows whether a proposition having terms that are
only opaquely known can be self-evident, or, in other words, whether
there is evidence when an essence, to which the terms refer, is not
known distinctly. Here we come across a remarkable but quite under-
standable passage. Our author says that Duns Scotus is very obscure
(innuit obscurissime) (11. 520-61). First, the subtle Doctor concludes
that a propositio is per se nota if its evidence is clear because the dif-
finitum is made explicit by the diffinilio. Thus, as has been pointed out,
the proposition homo est risibilis is not per se nota, whereas animal
rationale est risibile, which is a premise of its truth, is.15 According to
this line of thought a conclusion can not be per se nota, but the first
principles of the conclusion can. This agrees with the distinction
between the diffinitum and the diffinitio.
It follows that in mathematics there are propositiones per se note,
such as 'line is length without width', though a mathematician knows
the terms of this proposition opaquely and not distinctly. For a mathe-
matician does not know the essence of a line, knowledge that belongs
to the province of metaphysics. Mathematical objects such as lines can
be studied under different lights. Our anonymous author explains the
difference rather psychologically, I would say, without making its self-
evidence in any way dependent on actual knowledge of the intellect, in
the way e.g. Thomas Aquinas does.16 Only truths that are known with
abstractive knowledge can be self-evident, a claim that seems to be in
agreement with Duns' other semantic views (cf. Bos 1987, pp. 129-30).
This explanation of Duns Scotus by our anonymous author seems
to fit Duns Scotus' ideas as far as they are represented in his Ordinatio.
In the Lectura (as far as Duns Scotus can be considered its author) and
the Reportatio, Duns Scotus explains the differences in the way pro-
positiones per se note occur in, e.g., mathematics as opposed to
metaphysics in semantical terms, viz. primarily through a distinction
between terms that are simplex and simpliciter simplex,11 though the
'psychological' explanation is not excluded. Peter Vier's explanation of
Duns Scotus in fact suits the text of the Lectura and the Reportatio bet-
ter than that of the Ordinatio (cf. Vier 1951). In the Ordinatio Duns
Scotus is concerned with the self-evidence of principles used in, e.g.,
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mathematics as opposed to metaphysics.
The author next criticizes some contemporary conceptions of self-
evident propositions. A propositio per se nota cannot be deduced from
other propositions in any way f II. 627-77). This is made clear in a pas-
sage in which he discusses the criticism of Peter Aurio] by Francis of
Mayronnes. Our author thinks that, if Aureoli meant (as, according to
his friends, is not the case) that a propositio per se nota could occur in
a subordinate science, he was wrong.
Some other philosophers think, the author says, that a propositio
perse nota can be proved by levi dialectica (i.e., he explains, in a logi-
cal inference in which the premises are very close to the conclusion, so
that they are practically equally evident) (11. 697-701). He refers to an
"Adam Toutum", who may be identified with Adam Wodeham, though
up to now I have not found the expression levi dialectica in Wodeham's
works that are available to me. Wodeham says that assent by a geome-
ter to a conclusion such as 'a triangle has three angles of which the sum
is equal to the sum of two right angles' is not an actus rectus, but an
actus reflexus, which includes the evident knowledge of the premises,
leading to the conclusion.18 Our author replies that this thesis cannot
be defended by asserting the autonomy of sciences. This implies that a
science has self-evident propositions of its own, although a scientist
may know the terms only opaquely. The same principle cannot be both
irreducible and reducible. There is a difference, our author says, in the
knowledge of the terms (i.e. distinct vs. opaque).
Our author discusses some other views of a propositio per se nota.
He excludes the possibility that its truth originates in something outsi-
de the proposition. Any evidence originating from outside (evidentia
originalis aliunde) should be excluded. Duns Scotus had already criti-
cized other philosophers on this score, but the present text arouses inte-
rest because it presents a discussion from the early fourteenth century.
It is wrong to say that a propositio per se nota is known when it is
actually known (11. 769-82). One should not distinguish between a pro-
positio per se nota in itself and a propositio per se nota when actually
known. This criticism is directed against Henry of Ghent and Harvey
Nedellec (Herveus Natalis). The Scotist position is, as has been shown,
that only the terms play a role in a proposition's being self-evident.
Further, he rejects the distinction between a propositio per se nota
in itself and a propositio per se nota with respect to us, or to our intel-
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lect (11. 783-87). This interpretation can be found in Thomas Aquinas
(Summa theol. I, q. 1, in corp.). The conception of a pmpositio per se
nota quoad nos implies that the terms of Deus est are known properly
by a human intellect, which can not be the case.19 Our author criticises
this view by saying that, if a proposition were self-evident in one intel-
lect, it would be so in any other that conceives the terms under the pro-
per aspect (i.e. opaquely or distinctly).
Is there any difference between a pmpositio per se nota as far as
known by a wise man and as far as known by a fool? (11. 805-808) Here
Henry of Ghent and Thomas Aquinas, again, and others are attacked.
In a text which, according to the modem edition, was deleted (textus
cancellatus) by Duns Scotus, it is said that such a distinction should
not be drawn. The authors who uphold this view refer to Boethius. Our
author replies, following Duns Scotus' lead, that Boethius drew a
distinction between the conceptio communis of terms and a pmpositio
per se nota. The first is presupposed in the knowledge of the latter. The
first kind is proved, although syllogismo imperceptibili. He refers to
Scotus' own view as an adequate explanation of Boethius.
According to our author Duns Scotus rejects the idea of a hierar-
chy among propositions (11. 856-62). Duns criticises the view of his
master William of Ware, he says, who distinguishes between more or
less contingent, more or less impossible, necessary, and per se propo-
sitions. Examples of more or less contingent propositions are homo
currit which is more contingent, and homo est albus, which is less so.
Examples of more and less impossible propositions are substantia est
quantitas which is more impossible than homo est asinus, because in
the latter case the terms at least belong to the same genus. Among
necessary propositions. Deus est ens is more necessary than homo est
ens. The same holds for the pmpositio per se nota. A pmpositio per se
nota of the first order applies to terms that are known by experience
(e.g. the part/whole principle), while a pmpositio per se nota of the
second order, e.g. Deus est, has terms which do not derive from expe-
rience. As another examples homo est animal rationale is more per se
than homo est animal. Duns Scotus rejects such a distinction.
Some philosophers think that a madiematical pmpositio per se nota
is of the first order, and a metaphysical propositio per se nota of the
second. This distinction is subject to the same criticism. This view is in
line with Averroes, our author says. Our author adduces examples from
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Nicolaus Bonetus, with whose explanation he agrees. It is possible than
an intellect should know the proposition 'a triangle has three angles etc.'
first according to opinion (which is like the night) and later according
to science (which is like the day). Notitia opinativa is about terms in
general, notitia scientifica is about terms specifically. The proposition
does not have the same ratio in the case of different ways of knowing it.
The author comments upon the last solution that Duns Scotus gives
to the main problem: is Deus est a propositio per se nota1. (11. 863-86)
Scotus says that, as far as the term Deus refers to an intrinsic mode of
God, the proposition is self-evident for God and the angels, but not for
men in their present condition, for man cannot grasp the terms distinc-
tly. Deus est as far as known from the Bible and as far as known by
proof are different propositions, though their terms are the same. So
Deus est is a propositio per se nota for one intellect, and not for another.
Our author refers to Aristotle, who intends to say that, although
metaphysics, mathematics, and physics use the same terms, they form
different propositions, just because of the intellectual light in which
they consider them (11. 895-906).
5. Conclusions
1. The Tractatus de pmpositione per se nota, preserved in the Pisa
ms., offers an interesting interpretation of Duns Scotus' text on the pro-
blem, especially about the distinction that Duns Scotus draws when terms
are known distinctly or opaquely, i.e. in mathematics as opposed to
metaphysics. If a proposition about something known opaquely is known
only when the terms are known distinctly, the former is not self-evident.
2. The text gives insight in the discussion about the propositio per
se nota in the first half of the fourteenth century.
3. In his interpretation of Duns Scotus the anonymous author acknowl-
edges pmpositiones per se note in, e.g., mathematics. This implies the
independence of this science from metaphysics.
4. The definition is applicable also to something that can not be defi-
ned in categorial terms, but only in transcendental terms, such as God.
5. There is a difference in the text as in Duns Scotus, between evi-
dence and distinctness. Propositions with terms which are not known
distinctly can be evident.
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6. The evidence of a propositie per se nota is not dependent on actual
knowledge, nor can a hierarchy of pmpositiones per se note be accepted.
7. From our analysis of the anonymous commentary it becomes
clear that in the Lectura and the Reportatio Duns Scotus defines the
propositio per se nota primarily in a semantic way, and later more
'psychologically', by using the notion of different lights used by diffe-
rent scientists, without falling into the error, as Scotus and our anony-
mous author consider it, i.e. that of saying that the self-evidence is
dependent on the actual knowledge of a proposition.
Notes
1 I wish to thank my colleague Dr. J. W. McAllister (University of Leiden) for cor-
rections of my English.
2 It should be emphasized that medieval proofs of God's existence concern rather
epistemological questions, viz. in howfar God's existence can be proved through natu-
ral means, than establishing God's existence.
3 I will refer to the line numbers of its edition in Bos 1995.
4 P.C. Vier (1951, p. 78), who did not know the tract, also notes that Duns Scotus
is not unambiguous on this score.
^ There are not many studies on the history of the propositio per se nota in medie-
val philosophy. An excellent general survey are Schepers 1971, and Hunning 1989.
Geyser has traced, indirectly, the history of the notion (Geyser 1923), and discussed
the problem of the propositio per se nota in relation to the proofs of God's existence
(Geyser 1942). Between 1908 and 1913 S. Beimond published some articles on Duns
Scotus' view, which were collected in Belmond 1913. According to him Duns Scotus
accepted only proposiliones per se note of which the terms are confuse or opaquely
known. Rainulf Schmücker devoted a study (Schmücker 1941) to the way in which
Peter Auriol discusses our problem, and pays attention also to Duns Scotus. Contrary
to Belmond, Schmücker concludes that Scotus only allowed for propositions with
terms known distinctly. Father Peter Vier (1951) discusses Duns Scotus in a somewhat
digressive but in the main excellent study. He criticizes the interpretations of both
Belmond (1913) and Schmücker (1941). A. Di Noto (1958) wrote a book on the pro-
blem, but I was not able to inspect this book.
6 For the distinction among these three commentaries, see Ryan & Bonansea (eds.)
1965, p. 21.
7 It does not seem to be Plato's intention to reduce the ideas to the Idea of the good.
The latter confers value and usefulness to other things, he says in the Republic.
8 In the example just given, the middle term is 'triangle' (which has three angles etc.).
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9 The various kinds of necessary propositions are discussed in Duns Scotus'
Quaesi. in I el II Periherm. q. 8, n. 6, p. 459a.
10 This kind is also mentioned in pseudo-Duns Scotus, In Post. An., I, q. 21, n. 3
(not the subdvisions of the anonymous tract).
1 ' See text below, p. 420.
'2 Does he accept quantity as something absolute? This seems contrary to four-
leenth-century practrice.
^ It is clear, our author says, that according to Duns Scotus the expressions ex ter-
minis propriis, ex terminis suis on the one hand, and qui sunt aliquid eius and ut sunt
termini eius on the other hand are synonymous (H. 416-19).
14 P. Vier (1951) criticizes on the one hand Belmond's interpretation, according to
whom Scolus accepts only 'axioms' that are known through terms known opaquely
(Belmond 1913), and, on the other hand, Schmiicker's thesis, that Scotus hardly allows
propositions to be self-evident whose terms are only confusedly known (Schmücker 1941 ).
15 See text above, p. 417.
16 See Duns Scotus' criticism, text below, p. 420.
17 Cf. Vier 1951. pp. 82 ff., where further references can be found.
18 Adam Wodeham, Leciura secundo, d. I, q. 3, pp. 238-240. Cf. Adam Wodeham's
commentary on the Sentences in Gâl 1977, pp. 66-102 (esp. p. 100, n. 106).




Lecntra secunda in primum librum Sententiarum. Prol. and d. 1. ed. R. Wood, assi-
sted by G. Gâl, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.). St. Bonaventure University, 1990.
BOETHIUS
De hebdomadibus, PL 64; ed. Peiper, Leipzig, Teubner, 1871.
FRANCISCUS DE MARONIS
In IVLibras Sententiarum scriptum, Conflatus nominatum, Venetiis, 1520 (repr.:
Frankfurt a. M., Minerva, 1966).
HENRY OF GHENT
Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, Parisiis, 1520 (repr.: St. Bonaventure (N.Y.),
The Franciscan Institute, 1953).
424
HERVEUS NATALIS
In quatuor libros Sententiantm commentaria, Parisiis, 1647 (repr: Ridgewood
(N.J.), Gregg, 1966).
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
Ordinatio I, dist. l et 2, eds. C. Balie et al., Civitas Vaticana, vol. II, 1950.
Quaesliones in l el II librum Perihermeneias, Paris, Vives, vol. I, 1891.
PHTER LOMBARD
Sententiae, Grattaferrata, 1971 (Specilegium Bonaventurianum. IV).
PETRUS AURJOL
Scriptum super primum librum Sentenliarum, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St.
Bonaventure (N.Y.), The Franciscan Institute, 1956.
PSEUDO JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
In libms l et II Posteriorum Analyticorum Arisiotelis, Parisiis, Vives. 1891.
B. Secondary Literature
BELMOND, S.
1913 Dieu, existence et cognoscibilité, Paris. Beauchesne.
Bos, E.P.
1987 "The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus' two commentaries
on Aristotle's Perihermeneias"', in Logos anti pragma. Essays on the Philosoph\
of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans, ed. L.M. de Rijk and
H.A.G. Braakhuis, Nijmegen, Ingenium, pp. 121-39.
1995 "A scotistic discussion of Deus est as a propositio per se nota. Edition with
introduction". Vivarium 33/2, pp. 197-204 and 205-34.
BUONPENSIERE, H.
1903 Commentaria in I P. Summae theoiogicae S. Thomae Aquinatis, qq. 1-23,
Romae. Fridericus Pustet, 1903.
DENZINGER, H.
1955 Enchiridion Symbolorum {...), 30th ed. by C. Rahner, Friburgi Brisgoviae-
Barcinone, Herder & Co., 1955.
Di NOTO, A.
1958 L' evidenza di Dio rtella filosofia del secolo XIII (Utrum Deum esse sit per se
notum), Padova.
GÀL.G.
1977 "Adam of Wodeham's question on the complexe signißcabile as the immediate
object of scientific knowledge", Franciscan Studies 37, pp. 66-102.
DEUS ESTAS A SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION 425
GEYSER, J.
1923 Zur Einführung in das Problem der Evidenz in der Scholastik, Münster,
Aschendorff (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters,
Supplementband).
1942 "Systematisches zum Problem der propositio per se nota und ihre Rolle in den
Goltesbeweisen", Franziskanische Studien 19, pp. 73-115.
GREDT, ].
1929 Eiementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1929.
HUNNING, A.
1989 s.v. "Per se notum", in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. VII. edited by
J. Ritter. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschafl, cols. 262-265.
DE RIJK, L.M.
1990 "Ockham's theory of demonstration: his use of Aristotle's kath'holou and kath'
htiuto requirements", in Die Gegenwart Ockhams, hrsg. W. Vossenkuhl und R.
Schönberger, Weinheim, VCH Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 232-240.
RYAN J.K. & BONANSEA, B.M. (EDS.)
1965 John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965, Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of
America Press.
SCHEPERS, H.
1971 s.v. "A Priori", in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, edited by J. Ritter,
Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, cols. 462-467.
SCHMUCKER, R.
1943 Propositio per se nota. Gotlesbeweis und ihr Verhältnis nach Petrus Aureoli,
Werl im Westfalen, Franziskusdruckerei.
VIER. PETER C.
1951 Evidence and Its Function According to John Duns Scot, St. Bonaventure,
(N.Y.), The Franciscan Institute.
